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Politics, Influence, and the Small Scale Organization
of Political Communication Networks
Robert Huckfeldt
University of California, Davis
and
Paul E. Johnson
University of Kansas

This paper addresses the factors that give rise to both heterogeneous and homogeneous opinion
distributions within political communication networks. We argue that the factors sustaining
homogeneity and heterogeneity are not entirely symmetrical – heterogeneity is not necessarily
explained by treating it as the flip side of homogeneity. Two primary questions guide the effort.
If influence within a dyad depends on the distribution of opinions beyond the dyad, is dyadic
influence contingent on the construction of the network within which the dyad is located? In
particular, how does the micro-structure of the larger network affect the persuasiveness of
communication within the dyad? We pursue an analysis based on agent based models of the
communication process. The analysis points toward the importance of particular forms of small
scale organization in preserving homogeneous opinion distributions. Homogeneity is more
likely when network density is particularly high – when direct connections are more frequent
among more agents. Correspondingly, when we observe homogeneity within communication
networks in the natural world, the organization and reach of small scale social organization is
likely to be key.

Prepared for delivery at the 2010 Political Networks Conference, Duke University, May 21.

When studies of public opinion consider interdependence within electorates, they
typically focus on factors that give rise to persuasion and opinion homogeneity within groups at
various levels. The null hypothesis has thus tended to be heterogeneity rather than homogeneity,
and the arguments focus on factors that lead to agreement. Based on the tendency toward
agreement within small scale social organization, this effort focuses instead on the factors that
sustain disagreement and heterogeneity.
This effort views opinion heterogeneity within groups as a phenomenon that needs to be
explained. Factors sustaining homogeneity and heterogeneity are not entirely symmetrical –
heterogeneity is not necessarily explained by treating it as either the flip side of homogeneity, or
as the error term in a statistical model. To the contrary, the factors that create and sustain
opinion homogeneity are often seen as inexorable, while the factors that sustain disagreement are
more likely to be seen as brittle and fleeting.
This paper's argument and its analysis centers on an agent-based model. Several
questions guide the effort. If influence within a dyad depends on the distribution of opinions
beyond the dyad, is dyadic influence contingent on the construction of the network within which
the dyad is located? In particular, how does the micro-structure of the larger network affect the
persuasiveness of communication within the dyad?
The Political Heterogeneity Problem
Social scientists have historically held divergent perspectives regarding the roles of
persuasion and interdependence within micro-models of judgment and decision-making. These
micro theories have, in turn, generated divergent expectations regarding the consequences of
small scale social organization, friendship groups, and networks of political communication.
Paradoxically, and for very different reasons, political economists and political psychologists
have typically shared the expectation that political opinions should be homogeneous among
associated individuals.
In a thirty year foreshadowing of arguments related to the new institutionalism within
political science (Williamson 19xx, Ostrom 19xx), Downs (1957) argued that rational
individuals could reduce information costs by obtaining reliable political information on the
cheap through communication with others, but only if they obtained the information from
politically expert individuals who share their interests. And hence the resulting expectation is
that communication networks would be politically homogeneous, with political experts
occupying an influential role among homogeneously clustered agents. Other analyses, inspired
by the power of conformity (Asch 1956) and the discomfort of cognitive dissonance (Festinger
1957), view disagreement and heterogeneity as inherently unstable phenomena that inevitably
give way to agreement and homogeneity over the long run.
The descriptive reality does not correspond to these expectations. While it is certainly
the case that people who are located in shared micro-environments tend to be politically likeminded, it is also true that substantively significant levels of heterogeneity tend to persist. For
example, the National Election Study included a network name generator in its 2000 postelection study. Respondents were asked to name up to four individuals with whom they
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discussed government, elections, and politics. Among those respondents who voted for Gore, 36
percent reported that one or more of their discussants voted for Bush. Among those who voted
for Bush, 37 percent reported that one or more of their discussants voted for Gore. And less than
half of both Bush and Gore voters reported that all their discussants voted for their favored
candidates (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004). Comparable levels of agreement and
disagreement are demonstrated for major party supporters in other elections and other countries
(Huckfeldt, Ikeda, and Pappi 2005; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1994).
This effort adopts a network perspective in addressing the potential for sustained political
diversity within small scale social organization. Political behavior arises in particular contexts,
characterized by the non-trivial details of the ways that communication networks are constructed.
This argument does not deny the tendency toward shared political viewpoints among frequent
associates, and it is not antithetical either to purposive action or to social influence via the
psychological processes that are centrally related to processes of political communication. We
simply argue that political preferences and political behavior, rational or otherwise, are
embedded in "concrete, ongoing systems of social interaction" (Granovetter 1985: 487).
In this context, we locate the sources of heterogeneity at the intersection of phenomena
occurring at two different levels. First, the maintenance of diversity depends on the structure of
networks – particularly on the existence of open triads in which one actor is related to two other
actors who are not related to each other. These are the network structures that underlie
Granovetter's (1973) argument regarding weak ties, as well as Burt's (1992) analysis of the
strategic manipulation of the bridges between otherwise self contained networks of
communication. In contrast, our own effort is directed toward the consequences for persuasion.
Second, the maintenance of diversity depends on particular features of the persuasion
process. This requires that we focus not only on larger network structures – dyads, triads, and
beyond – but also on the individuals within the networks and the factors that limit interpersonal
influence between individuals. Rather than turning to well travelled paths by focusing on the
individual level factors giving rise to persuasion and acquiescence, we maintain an extraindividual structural focus. In particular, we consider the possibility that influence within any
particular dyad is contingent on all the other dyads within which individuals are imbedded.
Agent-Based Models
Agent-based models employ a framework in which computer objects—objects that
represent autonomous individuals—behave, interact, and adapt to one another (Epstein and
Axtell 1996; Johnson 1996, 2002), and hence they provide an opportunity to consider macrobased outcomes based on micro-level patterns of interaction. The models define a collection of
individual "agents" along with the setting in which the agents are embedded. The models
explore the interaction among individual agents in order to uncover the complex combinatorial
consequences of these interactions, thereby providing a vehicle to move seamlessly between the
aggregate and interdependent, interacting agents. In this way, the aggregate consequences are
not simply imposed on the agents. Rather, the behavior of the agents also produces aggregate
outcomes, and they experience the consequences through interaction with other agents.
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The resulting emergent properties of small scale social organization carry the potential to
be surprising and counter-intuitive. A number of analyses have produced a series of expectations
regarding the factors that prove to be influential in enhancing and inhibiting political influence
and agreement among and between citizens (Baldassari 2007). In the analyses that follow, we
construct a series of ABMs to simulate the dynamic consequences of these communication
processes. Our goal is to identify the factors that give rise to the preservation of political
diversity within networks, and ABMs are perhaps ideally suited to the task (Johnson 1999).
The Modeling Strategy
The models analyzed in this paper have been implemented in Objective-C with the
Swarm Simulation Toolkit (Minor, Burkhart, Langton, Askenazi 1996; also see
http:www.swarm.org). They include two separate design components: a "selection process" that
brings agents together for a one-on-one interaction, and a “persuasion process,” characterized by
particular opinion adjustment rules that determine the outcome when an interaction occurs
between two agents. The selection component is designed to parallel Axelrod's Culture Model
(1997a, 1997b). We address this model first before adding the persuasion component.
The opinions of the agents are treated as integers. If there are three possible opinions
about some particular issue, then the possible opinions on that issue are represented by the
numbers 0, 1, and 2. Agents hold opinions on multiple issues. Hence, if there are five issues in
the political sphere, we represent an individual’s stances on that collection of issues as a vector,
such as (0,1,0,2,2), where each entry in the vector represents the agent's opinion on an issue.
As agents interact, opinions change, and we are interested in knowing if the opinion
vectors of the interacting agents are homogenized. In order to do so, we employ measures of
diversity at the observational level of individual agents, as well as at the level of the entire
system – the diversity that is observed at the aggregate level. As Axelrod (1997a) demonstrates,
it is entirely conceivable that individual citizens never encounter diverse opinions within their
networks of interaction, even though diverse preferences continue to survive at the aggregate
level.
At the aggregate level, it is possible to tally and summarize the features of agents. This
allows the calculation of several summary measures, such as the average and variance of each
opinion. We also calculate a system-wide diversity measure, entropy, otherwise known as
Shannon's information index. If there are F different issues and T different opinions on each
issue, then the number of possible issue stances is TF. This measure of entropy is normed to an
interval where it equals 0 if all agents hold identical opinions and 1 if every possible combination
of opinions is equally represented in the set (Shannon 1949; Balch, 2000).
In addition to tracking aggregate levels of diversity, we are also interested in whether
individual agents encounter diversity. Social interaction among the agents comes in two forms –
encounters and acquaintances (see Huckfeldt 1983). One agent encounters another agent as part
of a stochastic process in which the probability of a dyadic encounter is dependent on
availability, where availability depends on shared locations in space and time. In contrast to
encounters, where the probability of an encounter depends on proximity and availability, the
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probability of an acquaintance depends on the existence of a shared opinion between two agents.
When one agent encounters another agent, a choice is made regarding whether to become
acquainted. This "choice" depends on the existence of a shared opinion, and in this way the
models directly incorporate a self-selection component.1
Each agent keeps a running tally of its social interaction experiences – of its encounters
and acquaintances. These can be collected and summarized to build indicators of the extent to
which random encounters between strangers involve opinions held in common, as well as the
extent to which agents agree with their acquaintances. For our models, we present three
individual-level measures.
Acquaintance. For each other agent that is encountered through the process of random
encounters, the agent checks to see if the two agree regarding a randomly chosen issue. Because
such agreement is a precondition for acquaintance, the proportion of encounters on which there
is a shared feature is kept as a moving average that we call "acquaintance." This can be treated
as the individual agent's expectation – based on accumulated experience – that it will agree on a
random issue with another randomly chosen agent. In other words, it provides a measure of the
individual agent's expectation regarding the probability that a random encounter might become
an acquaintance.
Harmony. When an interaction occurs between two agents, the agents "compare notes"
and discover how much they have in common. Hence, the level of "harmony" is the proportion
of opinions across all issues that are shared between two agents that are acquainted.
Identicality. Similar to "harmony", identicality is based on a comparison across all the
opinions that are held by two agents that are acquainted with one another. For an individual
agent, a moving average is retained for 20 interactions, and a 1 is added if another agent is
identical, and 0 if it is not. A value of the moving average of, say, 0.70, indicates that seventenths of the others with which the agent has interacted are exactly the same as the agent itself.
In summary, "harmony" and "identicality" indicators reflect information regarding only
those other agents with which a particular agent is acquainted, and hence they provide measures
of the agents' networks of political communication. In contrast, the "acquaintance" measure is
collected across all the other agents that are encountered by a particular agent, regardless of
whether the encounter actually becomes an acquaintance. It is important to note that these
measures are based on the experiences of individual agents. While agents cannot experience
diversity when the aggregate is homogeneous – when entropy is complete – it is entirely possible
for agents to experience homogeneity even when the aggregate is characterized by high levels of
diversity. The measurement procedures thus described allow us to explore these possibilities.
Model Dynamics

1

Hence, we conceive of an interaction sequence in which an encounter becomes a precondition for an acquaintance.
Encounters are stochastic events within particular settings, and they may or may not lead to the formation of an
acquaintance. In this way, encounters and acquaintances are specifically defined aspects of a more generally
defined interaction process.
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The model employs a square lattice on which agents are distributed, one per cell – see
Figure 1. Each agent has a set of discrete-valued opinions – issue stances, party allegiances,
candidate evaluations, and so on. For example, each agent might have a party allegiance taking
on three possible values – Democrat, Republican, and independent. In an implementation of five
opinions, each with three alternatives, an agent might be represented as (0,1,0,2,0); (1,2,1,0,1);
(1,2,1,0,2); etc. At the outset, each agent has a vector of features in which each trait is assigned
randomly from a uniform distribution.
At the beginning of the process, an agent is randomly selected, and a neighbor from the
von Neumann neighborhood – consisting of cells on the east, west, north, and south borders – is
randomly encountered.2 In the second step of this interaction sequence, an encounter is
converted into an acquaintance with probability equal to their proportional agreement on the
five opinions. (For example, if two agents share the same stance on 2 of 5 opinions, they form
an acquaintance with probability .4.) If they form an acquaintance, the agents communicate
regarding a randomly chosen issue on which they disagree, and the initiating agent copies the
opinion of the other agent.
In Axelrod's (1997a, 1997b) analysis, using a very similar model, diversity is preserved
only when neighbors have nothing in common, so that they do not become acquainted and hence
cannot influence one another. In contrast, if two agents become acquainted in Axelrod's model,
influence is automatic and heterogeneity is inevitably eliminated among acquainted agents. This
means the end result is either that (1) all agents hold homogeneous opinions, or (2) the grid is
divided into clusters of agents that are internally homogeneous absent any shared opinions with
adjacent clusters, thereby creating a socially impermeable boundary.
Subject to the same restrictions, this model provides support for Axelrod's conclusion
(Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004, chapter 6). Over the long run, heterogeneity within
clusters disappears. When all the agents belong to a single cluster, this means that homogeneity
is universal across all agents' issue stances. While the tendency toward homogeneity is greater
for some parameter settings than others, it is powerful in all cases. Clusters of shared opinion
develop which are completely isolated from one another because, lacking any point of
agreement, individual members of one cluster cannot become acquainted with members of other
clusters. Diversity is preserved in the aggregate sense, but none of the individual agents are
acquainted with other agents holding divergent opinions – none of the agents experience
diversity within their networks of acquaintance. Moreover, other analyses with a variety of
modified selection mechanisms sustain the result – the basic structure of the model is remarkably
robust with respect to the production of a stable homogeneous equilibrium.
The problem is, once again, that this implication contradicts the empirical record
(Huckfeldt, Ikeda and Pappi 2005). Political homogeneity is not the inevitably stable
2

Hence, there is no overlap in the opportunities for encounters among the agents. That is, none of the agents'
opportunities for encounters are shared with the agents with whom they might interact. And thus, none of the
agents' acquaintances will be the acquaintances of their acquaintances. This is usefully compared to the circular
lattice of the small world model (Watts and Strogatz 200xx) in which each node is also connected to four other
nodes. In the small world model, two of a central node's connected nodes share two nodes, and the other two nodes
share one node. We will return to this issue below.

6
equilibrium outcome within patterns of political communication among and between citizens.
Politically diverse individuals communicate with one another and are only sometimes persuaded
by each other. Hence, the problem that we face is similar to the issue addressed by Abelson forty
years ago. His dynamic models of social influence led to the prediction that "any compact group
of individuals engaged in mutual dyadic interactions at constant rates will asymptotically tend
toward complete homogeneity of attitude positions" (1964, p. 152). Later he observed that there
is a "virtually inexorable consensus" (1979, p. 244) – one that he sought to avoid (with only
limited success) by exploring various changes in the design of the model.
We address the problem by introducing an adaptation in the ways that individuals
respond to differences of opinion. The key ingredient is a density dependent understanding of
political communication and persuasion – an understanding that interprets dyadic effects on
individual opinion and judgment in the context of preference distributions that occur within the
larger networks of political communication experienced by particular agents.
Influence and Opinion Densities within Networks
A revised model includes two separate mechanisms – the original communicationinteraction mechanism as well as an influence mechanism that depends on opinion densities
within networks. In reconstructing the model, we pursue an emergent solution to the diversity
problem – a solution generated by the logic of interaction and interdependence that is built into
the model. The goal is to understand the process as a system in which diversity arises in a selforganizing way through an autocatalytic process – a system that transforms a wide range of
inputs into a stable pattern of political heterogeneity, depending only on the information that
agents accumulate through one-on-one interactions.
Moreover, we avoid models that require a highly specific set of initial conditions in order
for diversity to be sustained. Similarly, we are interested in equilibria that might be locally
stable – equilibria that do not come undone as a consequence of small random shocks. At the
same time the model should allow for the model to be sensitive to initial conditions and random
perturbations, both of which are particularly influential in complex non-linear systems such as
the ones we are studying.
The theoretical motivation for this alternative framework is the expectation that dyadic
interactions occur in a larger context that serves to moderate the reactions of the individuals
within the dyad – a context created through the ongoing interactions of agents within their
networks of interaction. In this alternative model, each dyadic interaction is thus interpreted
within the ongoing series of all the agent's other dyadic interactions.
Hence, when agents interact within dyadic relationships, they bring a context with them
that moderates their responses. Agents do not copy opinions from each other in an arbitrary or
automatic fashion. Rather, agents change their opinions only when, upon reflection, there is
sufficient support for the opinion that has been communicated through the interaction. We
assume that such a sufficient reason is found when a majority within the agent's existing network
of acquaintances hold the proposed opinion. In this way, the responses within dyads reflect the
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accumulation of individual experience, and the consequence of this accumulated experience is to
create a pattern of autoregressive influence which serves to preserve diversity.
The Network Solution and Autoregressive Influence
This autoregressive model marks a relatively minor but theoretically dramatic departure
from the earlier version of the model. The solution that we adopt recasts the problem of
individual opinion change within the specifics of the networks that create the social contexts of
political communication.
If you think that Obama is doing a great job on the economy, and one of your friends tells
you that he is inept, how might you respond? According to the earlier model, you would simply
change your opinion. But an alternative strategic response is to contextualize the information
obtained from one informant by contrasting it with information provided by other informants.
Hence if you like Obama's economic program, but your friend Nancy dislikes it, you might take
into account the opinions of others regarding his capabilities. If all your other information
sources suggest that Obama is an excellent manager of the economy, you might downgrade the
credibility of Nancy's opinion. In contrast, if your other information sources tend to agree with
Nancy, you are likely to reconsider your own opinion on the matter (see McPhee 1963).
In this way, any single piece of information is evaluated within the context of all the
information that is available. The social influence of any single interaction ceases to be
determinate, and the agent becomes an evaluator of information received through a successively
autoregressive process of social interaction.3
Autoregressive Influence and the Micro-Structure of Networks
The incorporation of autoregressive influence within the model requires that current
communication and information be evaluated in the context of past communication and
information. Hence, the communication-interaction process occurs as before, but each agent
maintains an ongoing record of past interactions, and they employ these records in formulating
their responses to new points of view. In this way an agent accumulates a set of acquaintances
that constitutes a communication network. When a particular acquaintance offers an opinion on
a randomly chosen issue, the agent polls the other acquaintances with which agreement has
occurred on more than one-half of the issues. If more than one-half of these acquaintances agree
with the opinion being considered, it is adopted.
Hence, the autoregressive weighting scheme produces an advantage for opinions that are
widely held within the agent's network of acquaintances. New opinions or novel preferences
should take longer to win acceptance, and individual agents should be less susceptible to
persuasion by opinions that constitute a minority position within the network.
3

We draw a distinction between autoregressive influence and autoregressive behavior. Behavior
is autoregressive if your behavior reflects the behavior of those who surround you within the
communication network. Influence is autoregressive if one informant's influence depends on the
information you obtain from other informants.
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Across a series of experiments, using a variety of communication-interaction modules,
this autoregressive persuasion model leads to outcomes that are dramatically different from the
earlier models in which persuasion is automatic (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004).
Diversity of opinion is retained, both within the agents' networks of acquaintance as well as
across the aggregated system.
At the same time, one might argue that the stabilizing influence is a simple artifact of the
model's decision rule in combination with the particular micro-structure of its interaction
module. Agents have, at most, four possible acquaintances (up, down, left, right), and hence the
requirement of a majority in favor of the new view amounts to a requirement of a two-thirds
majority among remaining acquaintances for agents with four acquaintances, and unanimity
among remaining acquaintances for agents with three or two acquaintances. Such supermajorities may be difficult to find, and hence, instead of demonstrating network-embedded
resistance to change, we may be demonstrating the stabilizing impact of a larger-than-baremajority decision rule.
Alternatively, one might expect that the effect of the autoregressive mechanism would
depend on the low levels of network density that are built into the model (Granovetter 1973; Burt
1992). The restrictions of the simple von Neumann neighborhood create networks in which an
agent's acquaintances are unable to become acquainted with any of the agent's other
acquaintances. All the triads in the simplest model are, by definition, open triads—none of an
agent's acquaintances are acquainted with any of their other acquaintances. Hence the aberrant
message communicated by a particular agent is less likely to be reinforced by other agents who
are entirely independent of the messenger.
In contrast, if the agents' networks of encounters were potentially of higher density so
that many of the acquainted agents shared similar patterns of acquaintances with other agents,
one might expect that disagreement would disappear. That is, no one would ever encounter
diverse preferences because every communication network would, at least potentially, become
entirely self-contained and likely to reinforce political messages, thereby creating political
homogeneity.
We consider this problem in several ways. First, we jettison the von Neuman
neighborhood in favor of locating each agent in the middle of a Moore neighborhood – a 3x3
grid where the agent randomly encounters any one of the other eight agents in the neighborhood
with equal probability. This creates significant levels of overlap between the agent's
neighborhood and the neighborhoods of the other agents. All agents share at least two neighbors
with each of the other agents in their neighborhoods. (See Figure 1.)
Autoregressive Influence in Moore Neighborhoods
This analysis is based on one hundred agents located on a 10x10 lattice, where the agent
is located in the middle of a Moore neighborhood. As in previous analyses (Huckfeldt, Johnson,
and Sprague 2004), each agent maintains an ongoing record of past interactions, and they employ
these records in formulating their responses to new points of view. Each time one agent
encounters another agent, it counts the number of opinions held in common with this other agent,
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and an acquaintance is formed with probability equal to the proportion of shared opinions. In
this way an agent accumulates a set of acquaintances that constitutes a communication network.
When a particular acquaintance offers an opinion on a randomly chosen issue, the agent polls the
other acquaintances with which agreement has occurred on more than one-half of the issues. If
more than one-half of these acquaintances agree with the opinion being considered, it is adopted.
Hence, the autoregressive weighting scheme produces an advantage for opinions that are
widely held within the agent's network of acquaintances. At the level of the agent's network, the
autoregressive feature of the model rewards majority opinion as it punishes minority opinion.
Thus, new opinions or novel preferences should take longer to win acceptance, and individual
agents should be less susceptible to persuasion by opinions that constitute a minority position
within the network.
The adoption of a larger neighborhood with correspondingly higher levels of network
density does not change the outcome. Diversity of opinion is retained, both within the agents'
networks of acquaintance as well as across the aggregated system. A summary of 100 runs is
presented in Table 1. The simulation stops after the entire list is processed 10 times without a
single change of opinion by any of the agents. In each of the 100 runs of the model, the level of
entropy is in the middle ranges when the simulation stops. The variance of the opinions is also
far from zero. Furthermore, the experiences of the agents indicate that they are located in diverse
acquaintanceship networks, as illustrated by the harmony and identicality measures.
There is not a great deal of variety in the time paths of summary statistics across runs of
the model. Consider the example time paths illustrated in Figure 3. Note that, because opinions
are randomly assigned at the outset, the entropy level starts at a high value. As the simulation
proceeds, the agents accumulate experience with their neighbors. The agents begin to adjust
their opinions in response to new input and the stabilizing impact of autoregressive influence is
made evident. First, the level of acquaintanceship is lower than in the previous models,
reflecting the fact that the opinions of the randomly paired agents are less similar. Encounters
still occur, however, because agents frequently have at least one opinion in common. As a result,
agents regularly encounter other agents with which they disagree on a randomly chosen issue.
Second, only a relatively small proportion of networks are composed of dyads with identical
preferences. Finally, the average proportional agreement with any acquaintance (harmony) is
only slightly above one-half. That value, which is consistent with earlier empirical results,
indicates that there is a considerable level of agreement among the networks, but by no means
complete homogeneity.
Agents on Multiple Lattices
Agents still have, at most, eight possible acquaintances in the context of the Moore
neighborhood. Hence, the requirement of a majority in favor of the new view still requires
substantially greater than 50 percent in favor of the new view.4 We address this problem by
subjecting the autoregressive model to a more challenging test. As before, the agent's
neighborhood is defined as a 3x3 grid, but agents are located on two separate lattices – a “home
lattice” and a “work lattice” (Figure 2). In this model, there are five separate lattices consisting
of 10x10 "home" lattices, and each day all the agents spend at least part of their time at home.
4

The ratios are 4/7 , 4/6, 3/5, 3/4, and 2/3 for majorities in reference groups of 7, 6, 5, 4, and 3.
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Some agents also travel to a cell in three separate 5x5 "work" lattices. These agents begin each
day at home, but travel to work at some time during the day before returning home. Across these
alternative environments, the agents continue to encounter other agents at random, and
acquaintances continue to form with probability equal to the proportion of shared opinions.
When presented with disagreement on an issue, an agent will adopt the acquaintance's opinion if
more than one-half of its agreeable acquaintances support that new opinion instead of the agent’s
existing opinion. Each “day”—one trip through the list of all agents—requires ten time steps
within the simulation.
At the outset, agents have formed few acquaintances and they are simply wandering
about, forming acquaintances, accumulating experience, and keeping records. After a few
iterations, patterns of influence begin to appear. The averages across 100 runs of the model are
presented in Table 2. Out of 500 agents, the number of agents persuaded to change in each day
is typically less than 10, and that number declines as the networks stabilize. The average
duration of the simulation is about 7,871 timesteps, or 781 “days” (trips through the list of all
agents).
The time paths of the measurement variables for one sample run are plotted in Figure 4.
As in other runs, the diversity measures stabilize after a relatively small number of periods:
agents report neither complete homogeneity nor complete heterogeneity. Note that entropy—
indicating diversity—starts at a relatively high level but settles down into a steady state in the
middle range, while agent experiences of homogeneity increase. As the harmony measure
shows, agents experience agreement with acquaintances about two-thirds of the time – across
two-third of all issues; and less than one-third of the agents' acquaintances hold identical sets of
opinions.
The results of this model address the concern that the stabilizing impact of the
autoregressive influence is an artifact of the small (eight acquaintances is the maximum)
networks that are allowed in the earlier design. The average number of other agents that are
encountered by each agent in this revised model is 39, and the average number of agreeable
acquaintances is 22. These results drive home an important point: diversity is not being
preserved by isolating agents from opinions with which they disagree. Rather, diversity is
preserved within the networks – both large and small, high density and low density – by
providing agents with an autoregressive decision rule for accepting or rejecting the opinion of a
discussant.
Autoregressive Influence in Small Groups
Perhaps the most demanding test for the autoregressive influence model is to consider it
within the confines of a small group where everyone has an opportunity to encounter everyone
else within the group, but no one has an opportunity to encounter anyone beyond the group. We
implement this scenario by locating twenty agents in each cell of a 10x10 grid. The agents are
equally probable to experience random encounters with any other agent in the cell, but they are
unable to encounter agents in other cells. This would appear to be a very demanding test of the
autoregressive influence model, and one might well expect to see homogeneity within the cells.
In fact, this is not the uniform outcome.
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Table 3 shows the levels of entropy, acquaintance, identicality, and harmony for the
entire population of agents, as well as for the separate cells. First, it is clear from Part A that
opinion heterogeneity is maintained in the aggregate, although the level of entropy is higher than
those of Tables 1 and 2. Moreover, the aggregated levels of harmony and identicality are also
higher, indicating higher levels of issue agreement in Table 3.
Second, the results within each of the 100 cells of the grid are shown in Part B of Table 3.
In this instance these measures are not based on the experience of the agents through the
simulation, but rather on a census of the conditions that existed at the end of the simulation.
These results are notable for their heterogeneity. In some instances, opinions become
homogeneous. In other instances, the agents polarize into two groups that are internally
homogeneous but share no opinions in common with the opposite group. For example, the level
of identicality ranges from .10 to 1.00. This means that, in some instances, the agents in a cell
become entirely homogeneous, in other cells there are only minimal levels of identicality, and
the mean for the entire grid is .44. In contast, the number of opinion clusters varies from 1
(when ever agent holds opinions that are identical to each other agent in the cell) to 8. And the
largest opinion cluster varies from 4 agents to 20 agents.
Social network models usually emphasize “connectivity.” Connectivity plays a role in
our models, but it appears it is not the most important component in persuasion and
homogenization of opinion. Diverse agents may interact forever without changing, as long as
each has recourse to a group of others with whom they agree (and thus resist the influence of
persuasion). Because of the simultaneous importance of connection and persuasion, we have
found it difficult to summarize the essence of the process in a simple directed graph.
Two “persuasion graphs” are displayed in Figure 5. In these particular example cells, all
of the agents have at least one opinion in common, so they can all interact dyadically. As a
result, we don’t draw lines for interaction. Rather, a line represents membership in the
“confirmation group” for an agent who encounters a new point of view. A line from agents 0
toward 1 indicates that if 1 encounters a new opinion, then 0 would be one of the agents to whom
1 would look for confirmation. In our simulations, all stable networks are fully recursive—if one
agent is in the confirmation network for another agent, the converse is also true. However, when
considering triads, the same is distinctly not true.
One interesting pattern is displayed in Figure 5a. There are 3 distinct clusters of agents
who rely on each other when new opinions are presented. Because of the dynamical processes
that are assumed in this model, it seems very unlikely that a slight modification in the opinion
pattern could upset this arrangement of opinion. The situation might be different in Figure 5b,
where we see that there are some weak links between the isolated groups. These links share a
majority of opinions with the two separate groups and they may act as conduits to “tip” the
opinion networks in a more homogeneous direction.
What does this suggest? Clearly, initial conditions, defined both with respect to the
initial random interactions and to the initial random distributions of opinions, are profoundly
important to the equilibrium outcome. To reiterate Granovetter's insight, behavioral outcomes
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depend on "concrete, ongoing systems of social interaction" (Granovetter 1985: 487). In this
particular instance, these systems of social interaction unfold as a consequence of
communication patterns, constrained by rules of interaction, that lead to particular patterns of
behavior which in turn constrain future patterns of communication.
Autoregressive patterns of influence do not necessarily create opinion heterogeneity
within small self-contained groups, but neither do these small self-contained groups foreordain
homogeneous opinion distributions. Combined with the random perturbations that are part of the
model, the inherent nonlinearity of autoregressive influence leads to complex patterns of
communication and behavior with outcomes that cannot be predicted. This lack of predictability
is striking. The rules governing interaction relatively simple and well understood, but the
equilibria are highly unstable and dependent on initial conditions (Boudon 1987).

Conclusion
What have we learned from this analysis? First, the effect of auto-regressive influence
with respect to the adoption of socially communicated opinions is quite robust with respect to
small scale social organization. In general, the model shows that it is possible to sustain opinion
diversity with respect to the small scale organization of social networks, even under fairly
extreme conditions. This is not to say that opinion homogenization never occurs. In some
circumstances, under particular sets of conditions, it is possible to generate homogeneous
opinion distributions.
The circumstance in which we are able to generate homogeneous opinion distributions
occurs when the potential for network density is extremely high. In this situation, each agent
shares an environment with 19 other agents, and each of the other 19 agents share exactly the
same environment. Moreover, none of the agents is able to encounter agents beyond this shared
environment, and the probability of encountering any one of the other agents within the shared
environment is equally probable. In short, this is small group politics with a vengeance.
Under these conditions, it is possible to generate homogeneous opinions, but it not
particularly likely. To the contrary, the typical result in such an environment is that agents
develop communication networks that, while reflecting their own opinions, also demonstrate
persistent heterogeneity. In this world, opinion formation is endogenous to social
communication at the same time that the formation of communication networks is endogenous to
agents' opinions. And the end result is that, while agents are imbedded in networks that reflect
their opinions, heterogeneity persists, and agents continue to experience diversity.
It is much more difficult to generate homogeneous opinion distributions when the density
of encounter networks is reduced. Heterogeneous distributions are generated when all agents are
located on 10x10 grids within either von Neumann or Moore neighborhoods. Diversity is also
preserved, within Neumann and Moore neighborhoods, when agents are distributed over five
"home" grids coupled with random patterns of assignments to additional "work" grids. While
these arrangements affect the speed and reach of communication, they do not alter the diversityproducing consequences of auto-regressive influence.
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None of this should be interpreted to call into question the efficacy of small scale
organization within networks of political communication. Small scale organization is, after all,
capable of producing opinion homogeneity. Rather, in order to preserve homogeneous opinions
within communication networks, it appears that a fairly extreme form of small scale organization
is necessary. Correspondingly, when we observe homogeneity within networks in the natural
world, the organization and reach of small scale social organization is likely to be key.
Political diversity and disagreement among associated individuals does not survive in all
societies at all times, but the survival of disagreement among associated individuals is not a rare
event, and political homogeneity within communication networks is not an inevitable
consequence. Just as important, diversity of experience and opinion, both in the small and in the
large, is likely to arise even if no individual actively and intentionally seeks to cultivate diversity.
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Figure 1. Agents in von Neumann and Moore neighborhoods.

Agent

(0,2,2,1,1)

Basic Model:
 A single agent in each cell
 An opinion vector each agent, e.g. (0,2,2,1,1) for 5 opinions
 Solid lines represent von Neumann neighborhoods
 Dashed lines represent additional cells of Moore neighborhoods
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Figure 2. Multiple home grids and work grids.
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Figure 3: Diversity in one 10x10 home grid with Moore neighborhoods
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Figure 4: Diversity with 5 home grids and 3 work grids
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Figure 5: Directed persuasion networks: An infinite Variety
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Table 1. Diversity with Moore Neighborhoods on the 10 x 10 Grid
Mean Across 100
Simulations

Std. Dev. Across 100
Simulaitons

Experiment Summaries
Iterations
TotalEntropy
Variance of Opinion
Issue: 1
2
3
4
5

1285.8
0.61744

273.991
0.03400

0.6347
0.6307
0.6282
0.6257
0.6298

0.100699
0.081715
0.087529
0.094818
0.094985

Summaries Across Agents
Acquaintance (mean)
Harmony (mean)
Identical (mean)
N. of Contacts (mean)
N of Contacts (std.dev.)
N of “friends”: (mean)
N of “friends”: (std. dev.)

0.48951
0.69828
0.48456
6.3796
1.6975
2.5527
1.7879

0.039445
0.03490
0.05859
0.15536
0.07886
0.363167
0.229525
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Table 2. Diversity Across 5 Home Grids and 3 Workplaces with Moore Neighborhoods
Mean Across 100
Simulations

Std. Dev. Across 100
Simulaitons

Experiment Summaries
Iterations
totalEntropy
Variance of Opinion
Issue: 1
2
3
4
5

8809.3
0.447824

1698.480756
0.09489

0.5489
0.54778
0.53084
0.52544
0.48842

0.203196
0.208084
0.21107
0.19480
0.19688

Summaries Across Agents
Acquaintance (mean)
Harmony (mean)
Identical (mean)
N. of Contacts (mean)
N of Contacts (std.dev.)
N of “friends”: (mean)
N of “friends”: (std. dev.)

0.564913
0.765975
0.50326
38.62
12.301946
22.18112
11.11455

0.081606
0.046533
0.082521
1.913635
0.80917
4.234838
1.875112
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Table 3. Small Groups of 20 Agents in Each Cell.
A. System-wide Summary of the 10x10 Grid
Values at Completion
Experiment Summaries
Iterations
2940
Normed Entropy
0.902
Variance of Opinion
Issue: 1
0.5489
2
0.54778
3
0.53084
4
0.52544
5
0.48842
Summaries Across Agents
Acquaintance (mean)
Harmony (mean)
Identical (mean)
N. of Contacts (mean)
N of Contacts (std.dev.)
N of “friends”: (mean)
N of “friends”: (std. dev.)

0.559
0.826
0.741
17.533
2.2224
8.353
4.571

B. Cell level summaries within the 10x10 Grid, based on the distribution of opinion when the
model stabilizes.
Indicator

Mean

Std.Dev.

Minimum

Maximum

Identical
Acquaintance
Harmony
Clusters
Largest
Cluster
Entropy
Normed
Entropy

0.55
0.83
0.68
3.30
11.69

0.24
0. 18
0.17
1.28
3.36

0.10
0.35
0.33
1.00
4.00

1.00
1.00
1.00
8.00
20.00

1.34
0.81

0.52
0.18

0.00
0.00

2.88
1.00
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Table 3 (continued).
C. Correlation matrix for cell level indicators.
Pearson’s
r
Identical
Acquaint
ed
Harmony
Clusters
Largest
Cluster
Entropy
Normed
Entropy

Ident.

Acq.

Harm. Clust.

1.00
-0.50

-0.50
1.00

0.98
-0.51

-0.73
0.06

0.71
0.18

Entropy Normed
Entropy
-0.79
-0.39
-0.08
-0.32

0.98
-0.77
0.71

-0.51
0.06
0.18

1.00
-0.63
0.70

-0.70
1.00
-0.71

0.70
-0.71
1.00

-0.85
0.77
-0.92

-0.77
0.38
-0.75

-0.96
-0.39

-0.08
-0.32

0.91
0.25

-0.92
-0.75

1.00
0.58

0.58
1.00

-0.77
-0.38

Largest

